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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-STANDING TO SUE IN FEDERAL COURT:

STANDARD-Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
THE DIRECT INJURY

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1950's many advances have been made in the
struggle to end racial discrimination as exemplified by the great
volume of legislation and case law dealing with the issues of civil
rights, fair housing, and equal employment opportunity.1 The re
sponse to this progress has varied. Some people have welcomed
these advances while others have merely accepted them. Many in
dividuals have responded by devising discriminatory schemes that
are not easily detected, rather than abide by the law and halt their
wrongdoing. Consequently, unlawful discrimination persists.
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood2 involved the dis
criminatory practice of racial "steering." Racial steering is a prac
tice whereby a real estate broker falsely represents to a prospective
buyer that the only homes available are those located in areas al
ready populated by members of that buyer's raciai or ethnic
groUp. 3 Prompted by the belief that two Chicago area real estate
brokerage firms illegally "steered" homebuyers to different areas of
the Village of Bellwood according to their race, some black and
some white residents of Bellwood tested their belief by engaging
the services of these firms. The real estate firms did allegedly steer
them to different areas of Bellwood according to their race. 4 Pro
spective black homebuyers were shown homes only in an inte
grated area of Bellwood, and the white buyers were shown homes
only in Bellwood's predominantly white areas. 5
In Gladstone, the Village of Bellwood, several of its residents,
one resident of a neighboring town, and the Metropolitan Leader
ship Council for Open Communities (Leadership Council) sued the
firms. 6 They claimed that the steering violated the Fair Housing
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974-1974(e), 1975(d) (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000(e)-2000(e)(15) (1976).
2. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
3. Id. at 91.
4. Id. at 95.
5. Id.
6. Plaintiffs were the Village of Bellwood, one black resident of Bellwood, four
white residents of Bellwood, one black resident of neighboring Maywood, and the
Metropolitan Leadership Council for Open Communities, a nonprofit organization
dedicated to eliminating housing problems in the Chicago metropolitan area.
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Act of 1968 (the Act).7 The Act declares it unlawful to discriminate
in the sale or rental of a dwelling on the basis of race, color, reli
gion, sex or national origin. This prohibition extends to the terms
and conditions of any sale and the provision of services in connec
tion with such sale. 8 The plaintiffs charged that the firms' discrimi
natory conduct had wrongfully and illegally manipulated the hous
ing market in the village and had deprived the individuals of their
rights to select housing without regard to race and to enjoy the so
cial and professional benefits of living in an integrated society. 9
The suit was brought under section 812 of the Act which pro
vides: "The rights granted by sections 3603, 3604, 3605 and 3606 of
this title may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United
States district courts without regard to the amount in controversy
and in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction. "10
Section 812 is one of two courses of action open to individuals un
der the Act. The other avenue of relief, section 810,11 provides for
administrative resolution of housing discrimination controversies.
Under section 810, any aggrieved person who the Act defines as
one "who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a
discriminatory housing practice . . . may file a complaint with the
Secretary [of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)]."12 If the Secretary decides to resolve the complaint, his
department may do so "by informal methods of conference, concili
ation and persuasion. "13 If HUD does not act upon the complaint
or fails to procure a voluntary agreement through informal methods
the complainant may seek relief in the judicial system. 14
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
the plaintiffs were not within the class of persons to whom Con
gress had extended the right' to sue under section 812. Noting that
none of the plaintiffs had been discriminated against in the actual
sale of a dwelling, the court held that their injuries were only indi
rect results of racial discrimination. It stated that such indirect vic
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-19 (1976).
42 u.s.c. §§ 3603-06 (1976).
441 U.s. at 95.
42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976).
Id.
42 u.s.C. § 3610(d)(1976).
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tims may be said to be included in the "person aggrieved" lan
guage of section 810, but that they did not have standing to sue
under section 812 which was limited to direct victims of discrimi
nation. 1S The court expressly adopted the reasoning of TOPIC v.
Circle Realty, 16 a case involving facts similar to the Gladstone
case. 17 In TOPIC, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress had intended section 812 to be
available only to those persons "who are the direct objects of the
practices it makes unlawful. "18 The plaintiffs in TOPIC did not
genuinely wish to purchase houses, and therefore, they were not
the direct objects of discrimination. The court reasoned that to al
low indirect victims to proceed directly to federal court under sec
tion 812 would destroy the statutory pattern of the Act. 19 The dis
trict court in Gladstone did not discuss whether the plaintiffs'
allegations of injury met the constitutional standing requirements.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that section
812 applied to indirect victims. 2o The court cited the United States
Supreme Court decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insur
ance CO.21 in which the Court had held that standing under sec
tion 810 of the Act should be construed as broadly as permitted by
article III. This generous construction opened section 810 to indi
rect victims. 22 The Gladstone court then held that sections 810 and
812 were alternative remedies open to the same class of plaintiffs. 23
If indirect victims were entitled to sue under section 810, they
were also allowed to proceed under section 812. The court con
cluded, however, that the residents lacked standing in their capac
ity as testers and so were not allowed to plead that they had been
deprived of their right to select housing without regard to race. 24
The court reasoned that because the residents never intended to
15. 441 U.S. at 93.
16. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976).
17. Plaintiffs were a civil rights organization and various individuals. The or
ganization sent teams of prospective home buyers of equal financial means but dif
ferent race to area real estate firms. Their tests showed that the brokers were engag
ing in racial steering. [d. at 1274.
18. Id. at 1275.
19. [d. at 1276.
20. Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978),
air d, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
21. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
22. Id. at 212.
23. 569 F.2d at 1019.
24. [d. at 1015-16.
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purchase the homes which they looked at, the defendants' conduct
had not deprived them of this right and they had suffered no injury
in that regard. 25 The court stated, however, that the other injuries
alleged by the individuals were sufficient to satisfy the injury
standard of the article III "case or controversy" requirement. 26
Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases and
controversies." The United States Supreme Court has held that
such a case or controversy can exist only if the complaining party
can show a "distinct and palpable injury."27 The Gladstone court
noted the importance of the right to enjoy the benefits of an inte
grated society and held that the deprivation of this right was a suf
ficient injury under article 111.28 The court also concluded that the
Leadership Council's allegation of injury was insufficient to satisfy
article III.
The defendants sought review in the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court, noting the importance of the standing
questions raised under the Act and the conflicts between Glad
stone, TOPIC and Trafficante, granted certiorari29 and affirmed
the decision of the appellate court.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

Before any party can bring suit in federal court, he must
satisfy the standing to sue requirements. In Gladstone the Su
preme Court explained that these requirements consist of the con
stitutional requirement of injury in fact and prudential standing
rules promulgated by the federal courtS.30 Prudential rules are
those not mandated by the constitution but which the federal
courts have developed over the years to help resolve standing is
sues and limit access to federal court~ Among these rules are the
requirements that the plaintiff allege an injury peculiar to him
self,31 and that he assert his own legal interests. 32 Also, these in
terests must be arguably within the zone of interests intended to
be protected or regulated by the relevant statute. 33 Because these
prudential rules are not constitutionally mandated, Congress has
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

[d.
[d. at 1016-17.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
569 F.2d at 1016.
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
441 U.S. at 99-100.
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
32. [d. at 498.
33. Data Processing Servo Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969).
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the power to dispense with them and grant statutory standing to
persons who do not satisfy the rules when such a grant will effectu
ate congressional policy.34 Congress cannot grant standing to some
one who does not meet the constitutional requirements. 35
The Gladstone opinion is effectively divided into two parts. In
the first part, the Court determined that, in passing the Act, Con
gress intended to define standing under section 812 as broadly as
permitted by the Constitution. The second part of the opinion sets
out the Court's finding that the village and the individual residents
did meet the constitutional requirements.
A.

Standing Under Section 812

In the first part of the opinion, the Court held that the ab
sence of the "person aggrieved" language from section 812 did not
mean that section contemplated a more restrictive class of plaintiffs
than section 810. 36 Section 812 provided only for enforcement of
rights granted by other sections of the Act. The defendants argued
that the right to enjoy the benefits of an integrated society had not
been expressly granted by the Act, and therefore, the individual
plaintiffs could not sue under section 812.37 The Court held, how
ever, that the right to be free from direct discrimination may have
been violated with respect to actual prospective buyers and that
the individual plaintiffs had been injured as a result of this action.
It was sufficient that the defendants had violated someone's rights,
and as a result, that the plaintiffs had been injured. 38
The Court's decision upheld the Act's enforcement scheme.
The Court found that Congress had always intended all plaintiffs to
have direct access to the courts, and that the administrative rem
edy had been added later as an option for those who desired it. 39
The Court also declined to accept the defendants' argument that
Congress intended to restrict direct access in an attempt to reduce
the potential for harassment, and that if section 812 was open to all
plaintiffs, no party would use the administrative remedies available
under section 810. 40 Thus, the Court ruled that Congress had
intended to dispense with all prudential standing rules in cases
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

441 U.S. at 100.
ld.
ld. at 102.
ld. at 103 n.9.
ld.
ld. at 106.
ld. at 103-04 n.ll.
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brought under the Act. Accordingly, the plaintiffs needed only
to meet the requirements of article III to have standing under
the Act.41
B.

Constitutional Standing Requirements

The second part of the opinion dealt with whether the village
and the residents met the article III requirements. In order to
satisfy article III, a party must show that he "suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant. "42
The village alleged that the defendants' conduct had wrong
fully altered its housing market. Such action could have the effect
of deflecting prices downward and diminishing the municipality's
tax base. The individual residents of the affected area alleged a
deprivation of their right to enjoy the social and professional bene
fits of living in an integrated society. Both of these allegations of
injury were held to be sufficient to satisfy article 111. 43
The complaints had alleged that only a portion of Bellwood
would be injured by the defendants' actions. The two individual
plaintiffs who did not reside in that area were denied standing be
cause they had not made a sufficient showing of injury. 44
III.

THE INJURY REQUIREMENT

As evidenced by the Gladstone decision, satisfying the stand
ing requirements is the first major hurdle facing a party who seeks
relief in the federal court system. Unless a party meets the stan'd
ing requirements he is prohibited from pleading his case. The
Gladstone opinion embodies two distinct facets of the law of stand
ing. The first part of the opinion recognizes a relatively recent
trend in standing cases toward an emphasis on statutory interpreta
tion and Congress' power to grant standing. 45 The second part rec
ognizes that Congress cannot grant standing to a party who does
4l. Id. at 109.
42. Id. at 99.
43. Id. at U5.
44. The Court noted that the complaints alleged no injury to the area in which
these two plaintiffs resided. Id. at U2 n.25. There was no allegation that people
residing outside the affected area of Bellwood had been deprived of their rights to
live in an integrated society. The Court stated that it would not foreclose considera
tion of their standing if, on remand, the district court allowed them to amend their
complaints to include allegations of actual injury. Id.
45. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 663, 665 (1977).
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not meet the article III injury in fact requirement. The injury re
quirement is one of the oldest principles of the law of standing to
sue in federal court. Although numerous approaches to the stand
ing problem have been advocated over the past two decades, only
injury in fact seems to have been consistently applied. 46 This arti
cle analyzes the injury aspect of the standing requirements, its ori
gins, its purposes and its faults. The conclusion of the article sug
gests an alternative standard that allows more willing and able
plaintiffs to seek relief in federal court, and at the same time, ac
complishes the goals of the injury requirement.

A.

Origin

It has been recognized since the early days of our judicial sys
tem that review in the federal courts is limited to controversies be
tween opposing parties. 47 The concept of standing as a distinct ele
ment of the case or controversy clause arose out of the case of
Frothingham v. Mellon. 48 In Frothingham, the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the federal government from giving funds to states which
adopted programs to combat infant and maternal mortality. The
United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not have
standing because she could not allege a sufficiently direct injury. 49
She could not prove that she suffered in a manner different from
any other member of the general public. 50 In the absence of such
an injury there could be no case or controversy under article III.
Justice George Sutherland's opinion does not clearly explain the
derivation of this injury requirement. Despite its cloudy origin, the
injury requirement has consistently been applied by the courts, al
though the decisions have been contradictory in other respects.
The Court once held that the injury must be to a legal right, 51 but
this distinction was later abandoned. 52 The Court has mandated
that the injury must be distinct and not one shared by the general
public. 53 Later, the Court held that it made no difference whether

46. Note, Standing: A Key to Flexible Jurisdiction-The Aftermath of Warth v.
Seldin, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 1247, 1259 (1977).
47. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892); Marbury v.
Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).
48. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
49. [d. at 487-88.
50. [d. at 487.
51. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. U8, 137 (1939).
52. Data Processing Servo Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970).
53. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
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the Injury was shared by the general public. 54 In all cases injury
had to be alleged.
In 1939 Justice Felix Frankfurter asserted that the concept of
standing and the injury requirement were mandated by the Consti
tution. 55 Injury in fact is not mentioned specifically in the Consti
tution, nor for that matter, is the concept of standing. 56 Neverthe
less, Justice Frankfurter asserted that it was implied in the case or
controversy clause of article 111.57 It was Justice Frankfurter's posi
tion that the framers of the Constitution expected the courts to
look to English legal practice for elucidation in defining the case or
controversy clause. Justice Frankfurter stated that the English
courts, as they existed at the time of the framing of the Constitu
tion, required a showing of injury before a suit could be brought.
He concluded that the framers intended such a requirement when
they inserted the case or controversy clause. 58
Raoul Berger, a renowned constitutional scholar, contends that
Frankfurter was mistaken. 59 Berger's research shows that, in some
cases, the English courts allowed suits by strangers without a
showing of injury. These suits could be brought under the ancient
writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. 60 Under these writs
suits could be brought to review administrative functions,61 compel
elections,62 and "to prevent disorder . . . on all occasions where
the law has established no specific remedy and where in justice
and good government there ought to be one. "63 Berger concludes
54. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973).
55. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (separate opinion). Justice
Frankfurter reiterated this theory twelve years later in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (concurring opinion).
56. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Require
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816,818 (1969).
57. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939).

58. Id.
59. Berger, supra note 56.
60. Berger uses these writs as examples of situations in which someone who
did not satisfy the requirement of locus standi could bring suit. All of these writs in
volve the actions of government officials. A writ of prohibition may be used to halt
an excess of power, as when an official attempts to act beyond the limits of his
power or when a court goes beyond its jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be used
to halt any abuse of power. A writ of mandamus, unlike the other two, is not a re
straint on power but is used to compel action by one who has a duty to act. A court
would act on these writs whether or not a party satisfied the requirements of locus
standi. Id. at 821 n.31 (citing Regina v. Thames Magistrate's Ct. ex rel. Greenbaum
[1957] Local Gov't Rep. 129, 132, 135-36).
61. Id. at 821.
62. Id. at 824.
63. Id. at 825 (citing Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824-25 (1792)).
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that the concept of standing and injury advocated by Justice Frank
furter had no counterpart in the English legal system at the time of
the framing of the Constitution and, in .any event, such a concept
was not familiar to the framers. 64

B. Analysis of the Injury Requirement:
Its Goals and Its Failures
In order to evaluate accurately the injury in fact requirement,
one must examine the purposes which the rule is intended to
serve. It is a safeguard against advisory opinions, it minimizes the
caseload of federal courts, and it ensures that the controversy is
presented in a form capable of judicial resolution.
The injury requirement has been defended by the argument
that it guards against the giving of advisory opinions by the
courtS. 65 An advisory opinion is a legal opinion handed down by a
court, concerning a hypothetical matter, which has no binding
force or effect. It is merely the opinion of a judge as to what the
finding of the court would be if that matter came before the court
in an actual case. Generally, the goal of a party who requests an
advisory opinion is to determine what the current status of the law
is on a particular issue. The court uses the injury requirement to
avoid giving an advisory opinion by stating that since the party has
not yet been injured, he may not ask the court for an opinion on
the matter. He must proceed in ignorance of the law, and if an in
jury is sustained, he may then ask the court for a determination of
the issue. Although the injury requirement may serve to keep the
court dockets clear for only justiciable cases, this is not the primary
purpose of the rule against advisory opinions. The primary purpose
of the rule, as Berger points out,66 is to prevent the Supreme
Court from giving Congress or the President advice about the con
stitutionality of legislation or other matters before those matters are
acted upon by those branches of government. The framers thought
that prior advice would bias the Court if it was called upon at a
later date to determine the constitutionality of the measure. 67 The
primary purpose of the rule has to do with our system of separation
of powers and checks and balances, and has nothing to do with
whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring suit. 68
64. Id. at 827.
65. Id. at 828-29; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-102 (1968).
66. Berger, supra note 56, at 830.
67. [d.
68. Each branch of our government has a separate function. Due to this separa
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Another justification for the injury requirement is that it di
minishes the caseload of the federal courts. In recent years the
federal court caseload has increased dramatically.69 The courts
presumably wish to devote more time to fewer cases in order to
ensure adequate judicial review. 7o Varying interpretations and
applications of the injury requirement and conceptual difficulties
inherent in defining an injury only cause the legal community
more confusion, which results in a multitude of suits which present
standing questions to be answered. In this way the rule is self
defeating. 71
The injury requirement has also been defended on the basis
that it ensures that the challenge will be made "in a form historic
ally viewed as capable of judicial resolution. "72 The Court has
stated that the requirement of injury ensures the existence of that
concrete adverseness between the parties that guarantees "that the
questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the is
sues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the
litigation would be pursued with the necessary vigor. . . . "73
The injury requirement does not ensure specific framing of is
sues, nor is the injury requirement the only way to ensure the nec
essary adverseness. A judge cannot tell in advance, by examining
the status of the parties, how the issues will be framed. Problems
relating to the formulation of issues raised by the pleadings may be
adequately resolved by means of a pre-trial conference. 74 Cases in
tion, each branch may act as a check upon the other. If the United States Supreme
Court were to give prior advice to the legislature, the Court would become part of
the legislative branch; in effect, it would be writing legislation. The potential preju
dice of the Court in favor of legislation which it had helped write would erode our
system of checks and balances. [d. at 830-31 (citing Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (1 Dall.)
14, 18 (1800)).
69. The number of cases filed in the courts of appeals has increased 486.7%
since 1940; there was also a sizable increase in 1979 over the figures reported for
1978. In the district courts, the number of civil cases filed has increased 345.3%
since 1940, 77.1% since 1970, and 11.5% since 1978. Criminal cases filed in the Dis
trict Courts exhibited a 9.2% decrease attributable to a number of factors. These in
creases have occurred despite the fact that an increasing workload is being handled
by federal magistrates. See [1979] ANN. REP. DIRECTOR AD. OFF. UNITED STATES
COURTS, at 2-11.
70. Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 407 (1976).
71. Wolff, Standing to Sue: The Capricious Application of the Direct Injury
Standard, 20 ST. LOUIS UNlV. L.J. 663,664 n.13 (1976).
72. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
73. [d. at 106.
74. Adequate formulation of issues is one of the tasks that can be and is in
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which there is no measure of adverseness, when the parties are
willing to spend their time and money for a nonmeritorious suit,
may be disposed of under the rules of "ripeness"75 and the rules
against collusive suits. 76 Assuming that some level of adversity does
exist, the injury requirement is an inaccurate barometer of the nec
essary level of adversity.77 Certainly there are other interests
deemed not to be "injuries" which would assure adversity as much
as, if not more than, some of the slight injuries deemed to be suffi
cient by the courtS. 78 The absence of injury does not necessarily
mean the suit will not be contested with the necessary vigor. The
attorneys are still subject to the same code of professional responsi
bility and fear of malpractice suits as they are when their clients
have suffered injury. These standards ensure that the attorney pro
vides his client with vigorous representation throughout the litiga
tion. As for the parties, the expense, time and trouble involved in
bringing a lawsuit in federal court will presumably dissuade frivo
lous suits. 79
To summarize, the Supreme Court has stated that the injury
requirement is mandated by the case or controversy clause of arti
cle III, but research has cast doubt upon that proposition. The in
jury requirement is presently used to serve many purposes. There
are other means of dealing with these problems which the injury
requirement is supposed to solve. In fact, it is unsuitable for some

tended to be accomplished in the pre-trial conference provided for in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
75. Ripeness refers primarily to the time when the suit is brought. When the
real issue in the case depends upon some contingent future event, the courts prefer
to wait for that future event. It will then be easier to evaluate the practical merits of
the positions of each party and the controversy will no longer be ill-defined. See
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947).
76. The courts have a duty to dispose of a case in which "the public interest
has been placed at hazard by the amenities of the parties to a suit conducted under
the domination of only one of them." United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305
(1943) (per curiam). Neither will the courts accept a suit where both sides argued
and agreed. See Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971);
Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 254 (1950).
77. Where no adversity exists, the suits may be disposed of under the rules of
ripeness and the rules against collusive suits. See notes 75 & 76 supra. Where there
is adversity, the injury requirement is an inadequate measuring stick. See notes
72-76 supra & notes 78-105 infra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text.
79. Once a party has invested time and money in a lawsuit, this expenditure
would serve to motivate him to carry through with the litigation, at least as much as
the injury in SCRAP. See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Func
tional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973).
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of the purposes for which it is used. 80 What makes the require
ment even more undesirable is that the courts have applied it in
varying forms that suggest no real consistency. A survey of recent
cases will illustrate this point.

e.

Recent Cases Interpreting Standing to Sue:
The Injury Requirement and Other Criteria
In the early development stages of the standing doctrine the
Supreme Court held that in order to acquire standing the plaintiff
was required to allege an injury to a legal right, "one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."81 In Baker
v. Carr,82 the Supreme Court abandoned these requirements. The
Court stated that the article III requirements were satisfied if the
party alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. 83
This personal stake would "assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. "84
In 1970 the Court returned to the restrictive requirement of
injury. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp,85 the Court stated that it was necessary for the plaintiff to
make a showing of injury. The Court did not demand that the in
jury be to a legal interest as defined in earlier cases. 86 The Court
held that the injury must be to an interest that is at least arguably
within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the rele
vant statute. 87 The plaintiff in Data Processing sought standing un
der the Administrative Procedure Act. 88 Therefore, they had to
show that the interests they sought to protect were intended to be
protected by that Act.
80. The injury requirement is not effective in diminishing the caseload of the
federal courts nor in adequately assuring adverseness. The injury requirement also
rejects cases under the guise of the prohibition against advisory opinions. See notes
65-79 supra and accompanying text.
81. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. U8, 137 (1939).
82. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
83. Id. at 204.
84. Id.
85. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
86. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
87. 397 U.S. at 153.
88. The Administrative Procedure Act proVides for suit by anyone who is ad
versely affected or aggrieved by the actions of a federal agency. 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1976).
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In cases arising under the Constitution the Court has imposed
more demanding criteria. In Linda R. S. v. Richard D. ,89 the
mother of an illegitimate child sued to force the district attorney to
prosecute the child's father for failure to contribute support. The
mother alleged that the state's practice of enforcing the law only
against the fathers of legitimate children was a violation of her
equal protection rights. The Court required the mother to make a
showing of injury and a showing that the injury was caused by the
state's actions. Although the mother could show that she was in
jured by the lack of support payments, she could not show that this
resulted from the state's practice of nonenforcement against the fa
thers of illegitimate children. 90 The Court further refined this test
in Warth v. Seldin. 91 In Warth the plaintiffs were required to
show that they had suffered an injury, that this injury was caused
by the defendant and that the requested judicial intervention
would adequately redress the injury.92 The Court has continued to
follow this test, although the causation requirement has been weak
ened somewhat. In Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Environmental
Study Group 93 the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
Price-Anderson Act. 94 The defendant was an investor owned public
utility engaged in constructing two nuclear power plants in North
and South Carolina. The plaintiffs were an environmental group
and several persons residing in the area where the plants were be
ing built. They alleged that construction of the plants would cause
them injuries and that the plants would not be built in the absence
of the Price-Anderson Act which they alleged was unconstitutional
on several grounds. The Court required a showing of injury, causa
tion and what the redress could be. 95 The Court ruled that to show
causation the plaintiff need only show that there was a "fairly trace
able" causal connection between the challenged conduct and the
injury.96 To establish what the redress could be, the Court stated
that the plaintiff need show only that there is a "substantial likeli
hood" that the relief requested would redress the injury. 97
89.

410 U.S. 614 (1973).

90.

[d. at 618.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
[d. at 508.
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
438 U.S. at 72-82.
438 U.S. at 75.
[d. at 75 n.20.
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The "causation~redressability" test is not used when suit is
brought under a statute which explicitly grants standing. It is only
used when the suits arise under the Constitution. The injury test is
applied in both categories. This has led to some inequitable re~
suIts, as exemplified by a comparison of two recent cases, Linda
R. S. and United States v. SCRAP.98
In SCRAP, the Court upheld the standing of five law school
students who sought to enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commis~
sion from issuing an order which would allow railroads to collect
certain surcharges. The students alleged that increased rates would
make it less worthwhile to ship and use recyclable goods. As a re~
suIt, more natural resources would have to be used to produce
these goods. The students maintained that these natural resources
could be taken from the Washington area which they used for rec~
reational purposes and that the increased use of nonrecyclable
goods could result in more refuse being dumped in that recrea~
tional area. 99 The students asserted that they would be injured be~
cause their enjoyment of these scenic recreational sites would be
hindered. 10o The Supreme Court was satisfied that the injury re~
quirement had been met. In Linda R. S., the Court reasoned that
prosecution of the father would result only in his incarceration, and
that if the father was jailed, the chances of receiving any future
support was only speculative. 101
These two cases cannot be reconciled. Surely the mother in
Linda R. S. was as severely injured as the students in SCRAP. Yet
the Court accepted the admittedly attenuated chain of injury in
SCRAP, but in Linda R. S. failed to consider that the father may
have made the support payments if he was confronted with the
alternative of going to jail. The Court viewed the causation ele~
ment in SCRAP with less scrutiny than in Linda R. S. because it
found that the students' interests were among those arguably
within the "zone of interests" intended to be protected by the Na~
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 102
The Court, in effect, is allowing Congress to decide who has
standing by determining who has to meet the causation require
98. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
99. Id. at 688.
100. Id.
101. 410 U.S. at 618.
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). The Court ruled that since the interest is
protected by the statute, the plaintiff has standing under the Administrative Proce
dure Act. 412 U.S. at 689.
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ment. The question of causation has to do with the merits of the
case, not the nature of the parties and their ability to pursue the
litigation adequately.103 The Court has stated that the question of
standing relates only to the status of the party and not to the mer
its of his case. 104 If this is so, the causation element should play no
part in determining whether a party has standing to sue. lOS
IV.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE STANDARD

Between 1960 and 1980 the Supreme Court has constantly
vacillated between extremes in the area of standing in search of an
equitable standard. The attempts to formulate a fair and reasonable
standing doctrine have consisted mainly of coupling the injury re
quirement with various other criteria. As has been seen, the sev
eral different threshold requirements that plaintiffs ,have had to
overcome during this period include: Injury in fact to a legal inter
est; injury to an interest intended to be protected by statute; injury
in fact and a showing that this injury was caused by the defendant;
injury in fact, a showing of causation and a showing that judicial re
lief will redress the injury; and a relaxation of the causation
redressability elements requiring plaintiffs to show only that their
injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct and that
there is a "substantial likelihood" that judicial relief will redress the
wrong done to them. Except for a brief period in the early 1960's,
the plaintiff has always been required to show injury. Despite
these efforts, the Court has not been able to formulate a satisfac
tory standing doctrine. The reason for this may be that the require
ment of injury presents a problem.
The injury requirement raises various problems worthy of le
gal analysis. Its most disappointing aspect is that it denies plaintiffs
who are willing and able to press suit access to federal court. To al
leviate this situation, the Court should dispense with the injury
standard as a threshold requirement.
The Court has stated that the injury requirement assures that
the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and the
litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor. 106 This is not
103. In his dissent in Warth, Justice Brennan states that requiring the plaintiff
to show causation is the same as requiring him to prove his case on paper before he
even gets into court, 422 U,S, at 528, See Comment, Standing to Sue in the Federal

Courts: Congressional Power to Reduce judicial Barriers to justiciability,
ERN NEW ENG. L. REV. 71 (1980).
104. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
105. See Comment, supra note 103, at 84-85.
106. See note 73 supra.
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necessarily true. Presumably, the presence of injury instills the in
jured party with sufficient motivation to contest the suit with vigor
and ensure adverseness. Motivation is the key. The Court should
look beyond injury to the totality of the facts and circumstances to
determine whether the party is sufficiently motivated.
In Sierra Club v. Morton,107 Justice Harry Blackmun wrote a
compelling dissent which provides a basis for arguing that a show
ing of sufficient motivation rather than injury should suffice to
satisfY the jurisdictional requirements. Justice Blackmun proposed
that any party which could make a showing of a provable, sincere,
dedicated and established status with respect to the subject matter
should be allowed to contest environmental issues. lOS
It would be desirable to carry this standard one step further
and grant standing to any party who could show a "sincere and sig
nificant interest" in the subject matter of the litigation. This
standard would ensure adverseness much more so than does the
injury requirement as applied in cases like SCRAP. In determining
whether the party's interest is significant, the court should look at
the nexus between the status of the party and the nature of the
wrong alleged. The court could then make a determination of
whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would be
sufficiently motivated to institute and maintain a suit in federal
court to redress that wrong. The court should view the party's in
terest as falling somewhere along a continuum of interest. At one
end of the continuum would fall those interests which can be
deemed to be significant to all persons, such as the right not to be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. At
the other end of the continuum would fall those interests which we
would not expect to raise much furor, such as, affronts to one's po
litical, moral or aesthetic sensibilities. 109 This is not to say that
those interests which fall at the lower end of the continuum could
not be sufficient to support a claim of standing. The court should
look to the totality of the facts and circumstances and the status of
the party to determine whether that party's interest is significant.
For example, absent any extenuating circumstances, the NAACP
could not be said to have a significant interest in preserving our
environment in its natural state, however, an organization such as
405 u.s. 727 ( 1972).
108. Id. at 758.

107.

109. This continuum of interest approach has been suggested by other com
mentators. See Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17
N.Y.L. FORUM 911,919 (1972).
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the Sierra Club could successfully allege such an interest. The sta
tus of the Sierra Club as an organization devoted to this goal gives
it a significant interest in any action which may hinder the attain
ment of this goal.
In addition to being significant, the party's interest must also
be sincere. The court would determine a party's sincerity by exam
ining what motivated his suit. The benefit the party expects to de
rive from the litigation and any ulterior motives which may have
prompted the suit are proper subjects for consideration. For exam
ple, Realtor A practices racial discrimination. Realtor B may deem
it advantageous to file suit in order to damage the reputation of his
competitor. Realtor B's interest would not be sincere. His goal is
not to end Realtor A's discriminatory practices but rather to impair
Realtor A's ability to compete in the marketplace. Consequently, it
is conceivable that his energies would be channeled in this direc
tion. Realtor B may dedicate himself to compiling evidence which
is extremely damaging to Realtor A's reputation but has little legal
relevance. If this should happen, the court would not have before
it the proper facts on which to base its decision. Moreover, once
this evidence has been exposed to public scrutiny, Realtor B may
be satisfied that his goal, to damage his competitor's reputation,
has been accomplished, and therefore, may fail to obtain the ap
propriate remedy or judgment. The court could also look to any
history of the party's involvement in the issue in controversy, and
how the party has conducted itself in the past with respect to that
issue. Any evidence that the party had initiated prior suits solely
for their nuisance value would militate against a grant of standing.
Deciding when a significant interest exists is no more difficult
than deciding when a party has been sufficiently injured. The
Court's tendency to vacillate between strict and lenient interpreta
tions of the injury requirement make that standard difficult to de
fine. The sincere and significant interest standard is conceptually
easier to grasp and allows for encompassing many more deserving
parties among those entitled to bring suit.
The courts would not be faced with a great increase in litiga
tion. The time, trouble, and expense involved in bringing a lawsuit
in federal court would serve to discourage many potential plaintiffs.
Strict adherence to the requirement that any prior suits were made
in a responsible manner would force any party to choose its cases
with care if it seeks to achieve its goals through the legal system.
Allowing a party who could not satisfy the injury requirement
but did satisfy the sincere and significant interest test to litigate the
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controversy would not mean that an injured party would have no
voice in the suit.110 Any injured party would be allowed to inter
vene under a broad interpretation of the Federal Rules. 111 If there
is "sufficient doubt" about the adequacy of representation,112 the
injured party should be allowed to intervene. This sufficient doubt
standard was broadly interpreted in Trbovich v. UMW.113
Trbovich involved a suit against a union alleging unfair election
practices. A union member was allowed to intervene when the Su
preme Court perceived that the members' lawyer, who was the
Secretary of Labor,114 was under an obligation "to protect the 'vital
public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that
transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union mem
ber.' "115 Adequacy of representation is not necessarily correlative
to the presence of injury and the courts have recognized this fact.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation CO.,116 the Supreme Court
allowed an employee to continue to represent other employees in a
class action after he had been hired and fired for cause and no
longer had any personal stake in the controversy.
The sincere and significant interest standard would allow the
initiation of suits by groups, such as the Leadership Council which
was denied standing in Gladstone. 117 Given the opportunity to
bring suit on their own behalf, these parties would be better able
to channel their energies and make full use of their investigatory
abilities and expertise to discover and rectify unfair housing prac
tices, and less time trying to find representative injured parties and
persuading these parties to sue. The individual plaintiffs in Glad
stone were denied standing to sue in their capacity as testers. This
determination would not necessarily result from the application of
the sincere and significant interest standard. Their concerted effort
to discover and document the discriminatory practices prevalent in
the area attests to their sincerity. The Court could find that their
1l0. An injured party could join as plaintiff or if necessary the complaining
party could have the injured party joined. FED. R. CIY. P. 19, 20.
lli. Federal Rule 24 allows intervention when the intervenor has an interest
in the subject of the action and when he is not adequately represented by the ex
isting parties. See FED. R. CIY. P. 24.
112. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538 & n.lO (1972).
113. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
114. The Court stated that in these types of cases "the Secretary of Labor in ef
fect becomes the union members' lawyer." Id. at 539.

115. ld.
116. 424 U.S. 727 (1976).
117. 569 F.2d at 1017.
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status as testers gave them a significant interest in the outcome of
the controversy.
This standard could be particularly helpful in cases in which
the residents live in a segregated area by choice. If the residents of
Bellwood had preferred to live in a segregated area, it is unlikely
that the suit would ever have been brought. If the residents were
unwilling to integrate their community, it is likely that the village
would have thought it politically wise to accommodate the resi
dents. Thus, the two parties who were granted standing would not
have brought suit and the discrimination could have continued. 11s
Often, the discrimination is so discreet that the victim never
realizes that he has been discriminated against. 119 In other situa
tions the victim may not sue because the time and trouble involved
in bringing a lawsuit would not be worth the gain which would re
sult from a favorable verdict. In instances in which the desired
dwelling has already been sold, the burden of litigation to redress
the past discrimination without the possibility of specific perfor
mance might not be worth the trouble. For these reasons, a grant of
standing to responsible groups and testers would greatly effectuate
the policy of the Act "to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States. "120
Applying the sincere and significant interest standard to indi
viduals is considerably more difficult than applying it to groups.
Unlike groups, individuals do not have a readily identifiable pur
pose, such as, the Sierra Club's interest in preserving our environ
ment, the NAACP's devotion to achieving racial equality or the
118. The Fair Housing Act does allow for action by the Attorney General for
equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976). This section allows suits only when neces
sary to correct a pattern or practice of discrimination or when the action is deemed to
constitute an issue of general public importance. The Attorney General has wide dis
cretion to decide what is an issue of general public importance. United States v.
Northside Realty Assocs. Inc., 474 F.2d 1164 t5th Cir. 1973). It has been noted that
which cases the Attorney General will bring depends upon his personal preferences
and the efficiency of his staff. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 166 (1969). The fact that this office is under
staffed is also cause for concern. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 209 (1972); Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 159,
195 (1973).
119. The process of racial steering is so subtle that the victim never realizes
that he has been discriminated against. The process itself is alarmingly simple. The
salesman does not offer any specific information until he is certain of the buyer's
race. He shows the buyer homes only in the "appropriate area" and tells the buyer
that any other available homes of which the buyer is aware are in poor condition, are
"bad deals" beyond his price range or have "just been sold."
120. 42 U .S.C. § 3601 (1976).
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National Organization for Women's struggle to achieving equality
between the sexes. These groups can easily show a sincere and sig
nificant interest in any subject matter or controversy that conflicts
with or threatens their readily ascertainable raison d'etre. This is
not necessarily true with individuals. This being so, the court
should apply the reasonable person standard. The court should con
sider whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would
be sufficiently motivated to institute and maintain a suit.. Consider
ation should be given to the fact that the plaintiff has in fact sought
judicial relief. Considering the investment of time and money
which a federal lawsuit entails, it is reasonable to assume that the
plaintiff has weighed this factor in his own mind before instituting
the suit and has come to the determination that the vindication of
his interest is worth the expense. This would seem to assure that
the party is sufficiently motivated. 121 Inability to show a long
standing interest and history of involvement in the subject matter
should not hinder the plaintiff's acquisition of standing. He should
be required to show that prior involvement, if any, demonstrates
that his suit is meritorious and not spurious. In cases in which the
plaintiff's sincerity is suspect and no history of involvement can be
shown, the court could, as an additional safeguard, require a show
ing that the plaintiff had undertaken responsible efforts outside the
courtroom, if any were available, to rectify the situation. Outside
efforts of a conciliatory nature would tend to show that the plaintiff
is sincerely interested in the subject matter of the suit and not in
its nuisance value.
The two individual plaintiffs who were denied standing in
Gladstone because they resided outside of the affected area may
have been granted standing under the sincere and significant inter
est test. They need not show an injury, but only a significant inter
est in fair housing in Bellwood, the sincerity of that interest and
possibly a demonstration of responsible efforts to rectify the situa
tion. 122
Although an injured party would not be foreclosed from
participating in the suit, it is in cases in which the injured party is
unable or unwilling to sue that this standard would play its greatest
role. It would open the courts to a number of deserving plaintiffs
121. See generally Scott, supra note 79.
122. All relevant factors that might affect the party's motivation should be taken
into account, including geographical proximity of the two communities and whether
the realtors were operating in Maywood as well.
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who seek to effectuate important social policies and would assure
that the suit would be presented in an adversarial context and "in a
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. "123
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court in Gladstone applied the traditional standing test
which requires that the plaintiff show that he has suffered an injury
due to the conduct of the defendant. The result was that in the ab
sence of a direct victim, only those persons who could possibly
have something to gain from preserving the discrimination were al
lowed to bring suit. The sincere and significant interest standard
would not have produced this result.
The sincere and significant interest standard tests the party's
motivation. It demands a determination of whether the party has
an interest in the controversy and whether that interest is sufficient
to ensure an adversary proceeding. This is done by scrutinizing
both the events which prompted the party to bring suit, and his
relationship to the controversy. The injury requirement is too strict
a standard to use as a threshold requirement, and it too easily
lends itself to use for other purposes. The sole purpose of the sin
cere and significant interest test is to determine whether the par
ties have that concrete adverseness that assures the courts of the
effective advocacy on which they depend to make their decisions.
Discriminatory practices have become so sophisticated that
they are not readily discernible to the victim. There is a need to
allow those persons who are experienced in such matters to take
the initiative and proceed to court to put an end to these practices.
Discrimination is repulsive to the values upon which this nation
and our judicial system are founded. Numerous public leaders have
exhorted the people of the United States to join together to end
this disgraceful practice. Yet, the standing policy of the federal
courts hinders such action. If the Court would grant standing to
those with sincere and significant interests in halting unlawful dis
crimination, then the burden would be removed from the often un
knowing injured party and placed on the American people as a
whole.
Vernon Gorton

123.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).

